This paper develops an R&D-growth model and calibrates the model to aggregate data of the US economy to quantify a structural relationship between patent length, R&D and consumption. Under parameter values that match the empirical flow-profit depreciation rate of patents and other key features of the US economy, extending the patent length beyond 20 years leads to a negligible increase in R&D despite equilibrium R&D underinvestment. In contrast, shortening the patent length leads to a significant reduction in R&D and consumption. Finally, this paper also analytically derives and quantifies a dynamic distortionary effect of patent length on capital investment.
[T]here is much to be done to understand the pace of technological progress in frontier economies. Our models of endogenous technological change give us the basic framework for thinking about how profit incentives shape investments in new technologies. … But most of our understanding of these issues is qualitative. For example, in the context of the economics of innovation, we lack a framework -similar to that used for the analysis of the effects of capital and labor income taxes and indirect taxes in public finance -which could be used to analyze the effects of … IPR policies … on innovation and economic growth.
-Daron Acemoglu (2009, p. 873) 
Introduction
Is the patent length an effective policy instrument to increase R&D? The statutory term of patent in the US was 17 years from 1861 to 1995 and then extended to 20 years as a result of the TRIPS agreement. Given that there is underinvestment in R&D in the market economy, 2 why hasn't the term of patent been lengthened to increase R&D? This paper attempts to provide an answer to these questions by developing
an R&D-growth model and calibrating the model to aggregate data of the US economy to quantify a structural relationship between patent length, R&D and consumption.
We find that the quantitative effects of patent length on R&D and consumption depend on the flow-profit depreciation rate of patents. Bessen (2008) estimates a flow-profit depreciation rate of 14%
for US patents. At such a high depreciation rate, extending the patent length beyond 20 years leads to a very small percent change in the market value of patents and hence has a negligible effect on R&D. In contrast, shortening the patent length leads to a significant reduction in R&D and consumption. In other words, there is an asymmetric effect between extending and shortening the patent length.
1 The World Trade Organization's Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), initiated in the 1986-94 Uruguay Round, extends the statutory term of patent in the US from 17 years (counting from the issue date when a patent is granted) to 20 years (counting from the earliest claimed filing date) to conform with the international standard. Due to the difference in the starting date, the effective patent extension was minimal. 2 See, for example, Williams (1998, 2000) .
This study also identifies and analytically derives a dynamic distortionary effect of patent length on capital investment that has been neglected by previous studies, which focus mostly on the static distortionary effect of markup pricing. The dynamic distortion arises because when the patent length increases, the fraction of monopolistic industries goes up and the resulting higher aggregate markup increases the wedge between the social marginal product of capital and the rental price. As a result, the equilibrium capital-investment rate decreases and deviates from the social optimum. The numerical analysis also quantifies this distortionary effect on capital investment. Laitner (1982) is the first study to show that in an overlapping-generation (OLG) model, the presence of monopolistic profits creates the usual static distortion as well as a dynamic distortion on capital accumulation due to the crowding-out effect on portfolio space. Chou and Shy (1993) analyzes this crowding-out effect of patent length in an OLG model. The present study shows that in an R&D-growth model with an infinitely-lived representative household, patent length creates a different dynamic distortionary effect on capital investment by driving a wedge between the social marginal product of capital and the rental price. This paper also complements the studies in the patent-design literature that are mostly based on a qualitative partial-equilibrium setting by providing a quantitative dynamic general-equilibrium (DGE)
analysis on patent length. 3 The seminal study on patent length is Nordhaus (1969) , and he concludes that the optimal patent length should balance between the static distortionary effect of markup pricing and the dynamic gain from enhanced innovation. In an exogenous-growth model, Judd (1985) concludes that the optimal patent length should be infinite. In contrast, Iwaisako (2003, 2007) show that the optimal patent length can be finite in an endogenous-growth model. While it is interesting to characterize the optimal duration of patent, the present study complements these qualitative analyses by providing a quantitative framework that can be calibrated to data to quantify the extent of R&D underinvestment and the effects of patent length on R&D and consumption.
In terms of quantitative analysis on patent length, an important study is Kwan and Lai (2003) , and they find substantial welfare gains from extending the effective lifetime of patent. There is an important reason for the contradicting results between Kwan and Lai (2003) and the present study. By using the same final-goods production function as in Romer (1990) , Kwan and Lai (2003) necessarily restrict the size of the markup to the inverse of the capital share. This usually innocuous parameter restriction equates the balanced-growth rate of profit per patent to the population growth rate that is nonnegative. Relaxing this restriction implies that at the empirical flow-profit depreciation rate of patents, the amount of profit captured by a patent declines sharply overtime rendering patent extension ineffective in increasing R&D.
In a related study, Chu (2009) considers a different aspect of patent protection by quantifying the effects of blocking patents on R&D in a quality-ladder growth model with overlapping patent rights.
The rest of this study is organized as follows. Section 2 illustrates the intuition of the main results. Section 3 describes the model, and Section 4 defines the equilibrium. Section 5 calibrates the model, and the final section concludes. Proofs are relegated to Appendix A.
Intuition of the main results
The first result of this paper is that at the empirical flow-profit depreciation rate of patents, extending the patent length beyond 20 years leads to a negligible increase in R&D. Denote We consider flow-profit growth rates of {-10%, -15%, -20%} that cover the empirical estimate of a 14% flow-profit depreciation rate in Bessen (2008) . 4 Given these estimates and an asset return of 7%, the percent changes in the market value of an invention by extending the patent length from 20 years to 25 years are {2.0%, 0.8%, 0.3%}, which are very small. On the other hand, the percent changes from shortening the patent length by 5 years are {-4.6%, -2.5%, -1.3%}, which are more significant. In other words, there is an asymmetric effect between extending and shortening the patent length on the market value of patents. The model in Section 3 provides a growth-theoretic framework that can be calibrated to quantify the resulting effects on R&D and consumption.
The second result of the paper is the dynamic distortionary effect (i.e. an increase in the patent length decreases the equilibrium capital-investment rate). To illustrate the intuition behind this result, the no-arbitrage condition equates the capital's rental price R to the sum of the real interest rate r and the capital-depreciation rate δ such that δ + = r R , which is constant and exogenously determined along the balanced-growth path. The aggregate markup creates a wedge (denoted by 1 ≤ d ) between the rental price and the marginal product of capital such that
is decreasing in the patent length T while the marginal product of capital MPK is decreasing in the capital-output ratio K/Y. Intuitively, an increase in the patent length raises the fraction of monopolistic industries and hence the aggregate markup. A higher aggregate markup increases the wedge (i.e. a smaller d ) between the rental price and the social marginal product of capital. As a result, the steady-state capital-output ratio and capital-investment rate must fall to satisfy (3). The R&D-growth model serves the useful purpose in providing a framework to quantify the magnitude of this wedge.
The model
The variety-expanding model is a modified version of Romer (1990) to an additional dynamic distortionary effect that causes the equilibrium capital-investment rate to deviate from the social optimum. To prevent the model from overstating the social benefits of R&D and hence the extent of R&D underinvestment, we follow Comin (2004) to assume that total factor productivity (TFP) growth is driven by R&D as well as an exogenous process of productivity improvement. In addition, the first-generation R&D-growth models exhibit scale effects that are contradicted by the empirical evidence in Jones (1995a) . 5 In the present study, scale effects are eliminated as in Jones (1995b) . Upon eliminating scale effects, the model becomes a semi-endogenous growth model, in which the long-run growth rate is determined by exogenous parameters and R&D has a level effect in the long run. The components of the model are presented in Sections 3.1-3.6, and the analysis focuses on the balanced-growth path.
Household
There is a representative household whose lifetime utility is given by 
Final goods
The sector producing the final goods is characterized by perfect competition, and the producers take both the output and input prices as given. In particular, the final-goods production function is
represents an exogenous process of productivity improvement that is freely available to final-goods firms. The production function in (6) nests Romer (1990) Therefore, Jones and Williams (2000) propose a more flexible specification that allows η to differ from one. The markup becomes 1 ) /( 1 > = αη μ that relaxes the parameter restriction between the markup and capital share. As for the exogenous process t Z , this study includes it to avoid the assumption that TFP growth is solely driven by R&D. Later, we use the empirical flow-profit depreciation rate of patents to help calibrating the model. Standard profit maximization yields the following first-order conditions.
Intermediate goods
There is a continuum of industries indexed by
. Once a variety has been invented, the production function is
the amount of capital employed by industry j . The profit function facing the producer(s) of variety j is 
Aggregate production function and the static distortionary effect
The total amount of capital employed by the intermediate-goods sector at time t is 
Lemma 1: The aggregate production function for the final goods is
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National income account identities and capital accumulation
The market-clearing condition for the final goods is 
) 1 ( (25) into (24) Proposition 1 in Section 4.3 shows that the negative distortionary effect dominates this positive effect.
R&D
The market value of a patent on a variety invented at time t is the present value of the stream of monopolistic profits captured by the patent until it expires at time t + T given by , and this marginal effect depends positively on the profit growth rate π g . Therefore, a highly negative profit growth rate (i.e. a high flow-profit depreciation rate) renders patent extension ineffective in raising the market value of a patent.
-11 -The number of inventions obtained by R&D entrepreneur
where t ϕ is R&D productivity that entrepreneurs take as given. This specification nests the "knowledgedriven" specification in Romer (1990) as a special case with 0 = β and the "lab equipment" specification in Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991) and Jones and Williams (2000) with α β = . The R&D sector is characterized by perfect competition, and the amount of profit earned by R&D entrepreneur k is
The first-order conditions for the R&D sector are
(30) and (31) together with (18) and (19) determine the resource allocation between production and R&D.
To eliminate scale effects and introduce R&D externalities, we follow Jones and Williams (2000) to assume that R&D productivity t ϕ is given by 
On the balanced-growth path,
increases at the exogenous population growth rate n . Therefore, the balanced-growth rate of t V denoted by V g is 
Decentralized equilibrium
This section firstly defines the equilibrium and characterizes the balanced-growth path. Then, we derive the socially optimal allocations and discuss the dynamic distortionary effect on capital investment. The decentralized equilibrium is a sequence of allocations 
Balanced-growth path
Equating (18) 
Socially optimal allocations
To derive the socially optimal capital-investment rate Comparing (37) and (38) with (48) and (49) 
Given the presence of positive and negative externalities, it requires a numerical calibration that will be performed in Section 5 to determine whether the market economy overinvests or underinvests in R&D.
The dynamic distortionary effect
If the market economy underinvests in R&D, the government may want to increase the patent length to reduce the extent of this market failure. However, an increase in patent length would worsen the dynamic distortionary effect on capital accumulation. Therefore, the government needs to trade off the gains from increasing R&D against the losses from the dynamic distortion as well as the static distortion. Proposition 7 The derivations are provided in an appendix available from the author upon request. 8 It can be shown that
1 provides the condition under which an increase in patent length would move the equilibrium capitalinvestment rate i away from the social optimum * i . The second part of the proposition is quite intuitive. When the patent length increases, the fraction of monopolistic industries rises. The resulting higher aggregate markup drives a larger wedge between the social marginal product of capital and the rental price. Therefore, the equilibrium capitalinvestment rate decreases. As for the first part of the proposition, the discrepancy between the equilibrium capital-investment rate and the socially optimal rate arises due to (i) the aggregate markup and (ii) the discrepancy between the equilibrium R&D share of capital r k and the optimal R&D share * r k . Given that the equilibrium capital-investment rate i is increasing in r k , R&D underinvestment (i.e. is the only factor input for R&D, r k equals zero and hence, only the markup effect is present.
Calibration
This section firstly calibrates the structural and externality parameters using long-run aggregate data of the US economy and then computes the changes in R&D and consumption by varying the patent length.
After that, the dynamic distortionary effect on capital investment is also quantified.
Structural parameters
The statutory patent length T in the US is 20 years, and the average annual labor-force growth rate n is 0.0166. 9 The annual discount rate ρ and the annual rate of depreciation δ for physical capital are set to conventional values of 0.04 and 0.08 respectively. β is set equal to α corresponding to the labequipment specification in Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991) and Jones and Williams (2000) . 10 Once the above parameters are determined, the model provides five steady-state conditions (summarized in (50)- (54) 11 To identify σ , the ratio of private investment to GDP is set to 0.202. 12 To identify α , the labor share of GDP is set to a conventional value of 0.7. To identify η through the markup, the R&D share of GDP is set to 0.0149. 13 To identify V g , π g is set to {-20%, -15%, -10%} based on the estimate in Bessen (2008) . Finally, to identify ξ , the long-run TFP growth rate
α is set to 0.0102. 
This number is calculated using data from 1956 to 2006, and the data is from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. 10 We have considered different values of } 3 , 2 , , 0 { α α α β ∈ as a sensitivity analysis, and the results are robust to these parameter changes. 11 Technically, v g is not a parameter but determined by exogenous parameters according to (42) . 12 This number is calculated using data from 1956 to 2006, and the data is from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. GDP is net of government spending. 13 This number is calculated using data from 1956 to 2004. The data is from the Bureau of Economic Analysis and the National Science Foundation. R&D is net of federal spending, and GDP is net of government spending. 14 This number is calculated using data on multifactor productivity (available from 1956 to 2002) for the private non-farm business sector. The data is from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Basu and Fernald (1997) estimate that the aggregate profit share in the US is about 3%. Also, the implied real interest rate is roughly in line with the historical rate of return in the US stock market. The calibrated values for ξ suggest that about 35% to 45% of long-run TFP growth in the US is driven by R&D.
Externality parameters
For each set of calibrated parameter values, the balanced-growth condition in (42) determines a unique value for ) 1 /( φ γ − , which is sufficient to determine the effect of R&D on the balanced-growth level of consumption. However, holding ) 1 /( φ γ − constant, a larger γ implies a faster rate of convergence to the balanced-growth path. Therefore, it is important to consider different values of γ (i.e. the negative externality in intratemporal duplication). Table 2 : Calibrated values of ϕ
Socially optimal R&D
This section computes the socially optimal R&D share of GDP
[insert Figure 1 here] Figure 1 shows that there is underinvestment in R&D unless γ is very small. To reduce the plausible parameter space for γ , we consider the empirical estimates of the social rate of return to R&D. Following Jones and Williams' (1998) derivation, Appendix B shows that the net social rate of return to R&D can be expressed as
Holding other things constant, r is increasing in γ . Table 3 shows that for the range of values 2 . 0 ≤ γ that exhibits R&D overinvestment, the implied social rates of return r are less than 8%, which are far below the empirical estimates summarized in Jones and Williams (1998 
Patent extension
Given the above finding of R&D underinvestment, a natural question to ask is whether extending the patent length can effectively mitigate this problem. Figure 2 shows that the magnitude of the increase in R&D depends on the flow-profit depreciation rate of patents.
[insert Figure 2 here]
At a high flow-profit depreciation rate of 20%, the effect of extending the patent length on R&D is almost negligible. At a lower patent-value depreciation rate of 10%, extending the patent length from 20 to 50 years increases the R&D share of GDP from 0.015 to 0.017, but this level of R&D is still far below the social optimum. This exercise suggests that patent extension is not an effective method to increase R&D.
However, shortening the patent length can reduce R&D significantly. Therefore, we find that there is an important asymmetric effect between extending and shortening the patent length on R&D.
The next exercise computes the percent changes in long-run consumption, which also determines steady-state welfare. After dropping some exogenous terms, the balanced-growth level of consumption can be expressed as
15 Figure 3 plots the percent changes in long-run consumption.
[insert Figure 3 here] Given the small increases in R&D from patent extension, the maximum effect on consumption is no more than 3% (percent change) at a 10% flow-profit depreciation rate and is as small as 0.6% at a 20% flow- 15 The derivations are provided in an appendix available upon request. Also, note that profit depreciation rate. On the other hand, shortening the patent length can lead to a substantial decrease in consumption. Furthermore, the changes in consumption mostly come from the direct technology effect of R&D on consumption, i.e.
Dynamic distortion on capital investment
Proposition 1 derives the sufficient condition under which the equilibrium capital-investment rate is below the socially optimal rate in (47). The next numerical exercise quantifies this discrepancy. Figure 4 plots the socially optimal capital-investment rates along with the US long-run capital-investment rate, and the difference is about 0.017 on average.
[insert Figure 4 here]
The equilibrium capital-investment rate is decreasing in the aggregate markup; therefore, extending the patent length decreases the capital-investment rate and causes it to deviate from the social optimum. Figure 5 plots the equilibrium capital-investment rates at different patent length and shows that extending the patent length would slightly worsen the dynamic distortionary effect on capital investment.
[insert Figure 5 here]
Conclusion
This paper provides a growth-theoretic framework that can be calibrated to aggregate data to quantify a structural relationship between patent length, R&D and consumption. At the empirical flow-profit depreciation rate of patents, extending the patent length beyond 20 years has a negligible effect on R&D.
Therefore, patent length is not an effective instrument in solving the R&D-underinvestment problem.
Although the analysis focuses on the balanced-growth path, taking into consideration the transition dynamics would not alter this policy implication. This is because if the long-run effect of patent extension on consumption is so small, accounting for the potential short-run consumption losses would make the overall welfare gains even more negligible. This finding of a small effect of patent extension on R&D rationalizes the fact that the patent policy changes in the US during the 80's were related to other aspects of patent protection, such as patentability requirement, patent breadth and blocking patents. 16 Finally, the readers are advised to interpret the numerical results with some important caveats in mind. Although the variety-expanding model has been generalized to capture more realistic features of the US economy, it is still an oversimplification of the real world. Furthermore, the finding of R&D underinvestment is based on the assumption that the empirical estimates of the social return to R&D and the data on R&D expenditure are not incorrectly measured by an order of magnitude. If it is indeed the opposite case that there is R&D overinvestment in the US economy, then the quantitative analysis suggests that shortening the patent length would be an effective method to reduce R&D. 16 See Jaffe (2000) , Gallini (2002) and Jaffe and Lerner (2004) for a discussion on these policy changes. 
Using the above definition, Jones and Williams (1998) show that the gross social return to R&D is 
